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Abstract
When the home country introduces a patent law after the winner of the patent
race is known the country’s welfare may rise only if the domestic ﬁrm wins. If
the home country decides before the patent race ends, the welfare may be increased
when the probability that the domestic ﬁrm wins is sufﬁciently large. In both cases,
the conditions on the product market determine the welfare gain and one may at least
doubt whether those conditions are satisﬁed.
JEL–Classiﬁcation: O34, O38, L52
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1 Motivation
While the ﬁrst reading of the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the patentability of computer–implemented inventions’ (European
Commission, 2002) took place, it has frequently been argued that European ﬁrms would
suffer a competitive disadvantage as compared to their US rivals when the Directive is not
implemented. The paper aims at shedding some light into the matter. Given that software
patents can be obtained in the US since the early 80s, the paper examines whether or
not domestic ﬁrms suffer a competitive disadvantage, under which circumstances they
support a patent law and whether introducing the law would increase the home country’s
welfare.
2 The framework
There are two countries j, j = A,B. Whereas the foreign country (A) has introduced
a patent law, the domestic country (B) has to decide on the issue. In each country there is
one ﬁrm i, i = 1,2. Firm 1 (2) is owned by individuals living in A (B). Both ﬁrms engage
in a patent race. It is assumed that both ﬁrms develop the product, e.g. a new software
package or a new computer chip but they infringe on each other. Hence, only the winner
of the race obtains a patent in all countries offering protection. The latter is granted the
exclusive rights for T years. In a monopolised market, the loser can sell his product only
after the patent expired. However, if the home country does not introduce the patent law
the loser can offer his product at the domestic market.
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Let pm
ij denote ﬁrm i’s monopoly ﬂow proﬁt in market j. Likewise, let pd
iB stand for
ﬁrm i’s proﬁt in the domestic market when the ﬁrms share the market, i.e. B does not have
a patent law. It is reasonable to assume pm
ij > pd
iB.
The consumers’ surplus shall be a function S(n), where n=1,2 is the number of ﬁrms
in the market. Without a threat of entry, a monopolist charges a higher price or offers a
lower quantity as compared to a duopolist so that S(2) ≥ S(1). The instantaneous welfare
of a country comprises the consumers’ and the ﬁrms’ surplus consisting in the domestic
ﬁrms’ proﬁts accrued from both markets.
Given this setup, the following cases can be distinguished:
(I) only country A has patent protection and ﬁrm 1 wins the race,
(II) both countries have patent protection and ﬁrm 1 wins,
(III) only country A has patent protection and ﬁrm 2 wins, and
(IV) both countries have patent protection and ﬁrm 2 wins.
Consider case I. Here, ﬁrm 1 is the monopoly in market A for T years and both ﬁrms
sell their products in the domestic markets. The discounted present value of the ﬂow






















where b = e−rT and the superscript marks the case.
In case II, ﬁrm 1 holds the monopoly position in both countries for T years. The
domestic ﬁrm can only offer its product after the patent has expired. The present value of























Case III describes the situation where ﬁrm 2 monopolises the foreign market for T
years, but the foreign ﬁrm 1 offers its product in the domestic market. The present values





















Finally, in case IV, ﬁrm 2 becomes the monopoly in A and B. Then, the present value

































1Bdt. Solving the integrals yields the form given in equation
(1). In a similar way, the other equations are obtained.Do European computer–related patents increase welfare? 3
3 Welfare analysis
Whether ﬁrms and the home country beneﬁt from the introduction of a patent law can
be determined by comparing cases I and II on the one hand on the other hand cases III



















2B] < 0. (5)
The equations present the difference in the present value of proﬁts (welfare) with and
without discovery protection. Whereas the foreign ﬁrm gains from a patent law, the do-
mestic ﬁrm and the home country as a whole lose. If the home country does not grant
intellectual property rights, the domestic market becomes a shelter for the loser, i.e. the
domestic ﬁrm, during the T years. After the patent has expired both ﬁrms are on equal
footing again. Then, by passing the patent law, the home country destroys the domes-
tic ﬁrm’s refuge. Accordingly, the domestic ﬁrm ﬁnds a patent disadvantageous. Over
and above the reduction in the ﬁrms’ surplus, patent protection monopolises the product
market so that the consumers’ surplus shrinks as well. Consequently, a patent law un-
ambiguously reduces welfare. In contrast, the foreign ﬁrm earns the higher monopoly
proﬁt as compared to the duopoly one if the loser’s shelter is destroyed by the change in
law. In addition, it can be argued that introducing the patent law entails a competitive
disadvantage vis ` a vis for the domestic ﬁrm.





















Now, the home country grants the foreign ﬁrm a shelter when the patent law is not passed.
By analogous reasons to the above stated, the foreign ﬁrm loses and suffers a competitive
disadvantage vis ` a vis the domestic ﬁrm if the home country does not protect discoveries.
However, the reverse conclusion that the domestic ﬁrm gains a competitive advantage
over the foreign ﬁrm is not entirely correct. By winning the patent race the domestic ﬁrm
has already a competitive advantage over the foreign rival and this advantage is merely
increased by the introduction of the patent law.
However, the last equation reveals that the home country’s welfare is not necessarily
increasing after the legal system has been changed. The ﬁrms’ surplus is rising, but the
consumers’ surplus is shrinking due to the introduction of the patent law. Hence, only if
the increase in the ﬁrms’ surplus outweighs the decrease in the consumers’ surplus, i.e. if
pm
2B−pd
2B > S(2)−S(1), the home country will pass the patent law.
The preceding analysis postulated that the home country can decide on the patent law
after the winner of the race has been revealed. More often than not, some patent races
have been decided, some races begun but are not yet ﬁnished, whereas the majority of
races have not even started when the home country takes its choice. To assess the ex–ante
desirability of a patent law, let the home country assign a certain probability p to the event








ﬁrst is 1− p. Then, the ex–ante changes in the present value of the proﬁts DPi and the


















These changes in the present values measure the ex–ante desirability of a patent protection
incountryBfortheﬁrmsandthehomecountry. Supposethattheforeignandthedomestic






2B. Let z denote the
relative duopoly proﬁt, i.e. z ≡ pd
B/pm
B, z ∈ [0,1]. In addition, let p1(z), p2(z) and ps(z)
be deﬁned as follows: p1(z) ≡ 1−z, p2(z) ≡ z and ps(z) ≡ z+[S(2)−S(1)]/pm
B. For
every relative duopoly proﬁt z, the function pi determines the probability p for which the
ﬁrms and the home country are ex–ante indifferent between changing and not changing
the legal system. The functions pi are drawn in ﬁgure 1.
According to (7), the domestic ﬁrm ex–ante supports the patent law if the probability
of winning the race is sufﬁciently large, i.e. p ≥ p2. The foreign ﬁrm takes the opposite
position, i.e. it prefers the patent law as long as p ≤ p1. Area A marks situations in
which the foreign and the domestic ﬁrm beneﬁt from a patent law, whereas in situations
illustrated by area B, neither ﬁrm gains from patent protection. The reasons for the results
can easily be revealed by considering the extreme cases of z = 0 and z = 1. In the former
one, the relative duopoly proﬁt is zero, as e.g. in a price setting duopoly producing a
homogeneous good. If a ﬁrm loses a patent race it receives zero proﬁt even though the
home country does not protect discoveries. However, when the home country changes the
legal system, the expected proﬁts are strictly positive as long as the probability of winning
the patent race is strictly positive. The latter applies to the foreign as well as the domestic




i denote the ex–ante present value in a situation with and without a patent law. Then, the
functions are deﬁned as P
p
i = (1− p)PII
i + pPIV
i and Pn
i = (1− p)PI
i + pPIII
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On the other hand, if z = 1, the duopoly and the monopoly proﬁt are identical. This
situation may arise if products are independent, but both need a component developed by
the winner of the race. Given the home country does not introduce the patent law, both
ﬁrms realise the monopoly proﬁt with certainty. In contrast, if discoveries are protected,
the expected proﬁt for both ﬁrms is lower as long as they do not win with certainty. Hence,
neither ﬁrm wishes a patent law.
Finally, the introduction of patent protection will increase the home country’s welfare
if the probability that the domestic ﬁrm wins the race is sufﬁciently large, i.e. if p ≥
ps(> p2). Yet, ps may exceed one so that the home country will never beneﬁt from the
patent law. From the deﬁnition of ps, it can be concluded that this situation becomes the
more likely the larger the relative duopoly proﬁt z is. However, depending on the precise
relationship between the increase in the consumers’ surplus and the monopoly proﬁt, the
home country may decide against the patent law even though z=0. This situation appears




If the home country decides on the introduction of patent protection after the winner
of the race has be revealed the desirability of protection depends on the losers origin.
While changing the legal system is advantageous neither for the home country nor for
the domestic ﬁrm when the latter loses the race, positions may differ if the domestic ﬁrm
wins. Then, the domestic ﬁrm always supports the law, whereas the home country only
passes the law if the difference between the monopoly and the duopoly proﬁt exceeds the
loss in the consumers’ surplus. Depending on the nature of product market competition,
this may never be the case. Concerning the competitive disadvantage argument, it has
been demonstrated that establishing property rights in the home country (1) increases the
competitive disadvantage for the domestic ﬁrm in case it loses the race and (2) increases
the competitive advantage in case it wins the race.
Given the home country has to decide on patent protection before the winner of the
patent race is revealed, ﬁrms gain by the law if the probability of winning itself is sufﬁ-
ciently large. The home country’s welfare tends as well to increase if the probability of
the domestic ﬁrm winning the race is sufﬁciently high. Again, depending on the precise
conditions on the product market the home country may never ﬁnd it worthwhile passing
the law.
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